Commentary on Daniel C. Dennett (I983) Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The "Panglossian paradigm" defended. BBS 6:343-390.
posite polarity to Dennett's. It will explore the implications of Dennett's alignment of adaptationism with mentalism, and argue in conclusion that Dennett's defense of adaptationism ought not to be welcomed by adaptationists.
The more rhetorical ofDennett' s comparisons between Could & Lewontin and Skinner point out, for example, that each party claims its opponents' explanations to be too easy to invent, and that each exploits especially poor examples of opponents' thinking. It would be hard to find a serious debate in which these techniques were unused; exaggerating ones opponent's flaws hardly makes one a Skinnerian. In a much more substantive critique, Dennett says that Gould & Lewontin, like Skinner.
prefer historical causes to post hoc "rationalizations," and for this reason reject the assumptions of optimality which are shared by mentalism and adaptationism. Mentalism assumes optimal rationality in the psychological subject (for reasons to be discussed later). Biological adaptationism assumes that organisms are optimally adapted to their environments. Skinner's opposition to mentalism can be traced to its optimality assumptions; likewise Gould & Lewontin' s opposition to adaptationism. But the problem, according to Dennett, is not that adaptationism and mentalism are falsely accused of being irrefutable and tautologous. In fact, the critics are right in this judgement. The critics' mistake is their assumption that what is irrefutable must lack scientific value. Mentalism and adaptationism are not themselves theories, to be judged by their fit to the data. They are rather "stances or strategies that serve to organize data, explain interrelations, and generate questions to ask Nature" (Dennett 1983, p. 353) . Stances and strategies have scientific value independent of their falsifiability. Gould & Lewontin' s criticism of adaptationism and Skinner's of mentalism are mistaken for the same reasons. Adaptationism stands to its critics as mentalism stands to behaviorism.
2. Adaptationlsm as behaviorism. We will return to Dennett's analogy, but first I will introduce a rival version. My version rests on similarities in the structure of explanations in psychology and evolutionary theory. The first similarity has been independently recognized by many authors. Among them are two of the campers Dennett has so gleefully assigned to the same tentRichard Lewontin and B. F. Skinner. A third is an even stranger bedfellow, and one whom I expose with a great pretence of reluctance -Daniel Dennett himself (Lewontin 1982; Skinner 1981; Dennett 1975) . Each of these writers has pointed out the similarity between natural selection and the Law of Effect.
Natural selection explains phylogenetic adaptation by positing a nondirected ("random") source of heritable variation within the lineage, together with selection by the environment of those variants which happen by chance to be better suited to survival and reproduction. The Law of Effect (with its cognates trial-anderror learning and operant conditioning) explains the ontogenetic adaptation of individual behavior (what we call "learning'") by positing nondirected ("spontaneous'} variations in behavior, together with some form of selection by the environment which allows successful behavior to persist and the unsuccessful to die out. In each case, the adaptations are cumulative, and so indefinitely fine tuning is possible in theory. The ontogenetic behavioral adaptation of the learning organism can be explained by a selective mechanism virtually identical in its structure to that used to explain the phylogenetic adaptation of the evolving species.
The important point is not just that the parallel exists. It is that the selective mechanism possesses a sort of singularity. It is arguably the only explanation of complex (i.e. nonaccidental) adaptedness which does not beg the question. It produces a naturalistic explanation, perhaps the only such explanation, of the phenomena which have given comfort to teleologists throughout the ages. I The selectionist mode of explanation is surely one of the most intellectually satisfying achievements of the 19th century.2 We can now give a naturalistic answer to the question ofhowadaptations come about. But a related question is not settled with the acceptance of selection. It is this: Which characters of organisms are adaptations? In biology this is by no means a simple issue. The debates about adaptationism are not about whether natural selection is the appropriate explanation of adaptations-virtually everyone agrees that it is. The issue is how adaptations are identified, not how they are explained.
Accepting selection as the sole mechanism of adaptation can create semantic problems. An example is the conflict between .new and old criteria for use of the term .. adaptation." We are commonsensically tempted to say that a character is "well adapted" (or .. an adaptation") to a task just in case it performs the task well. In this sense, human eyebrows must be an adaptation for keeping perspiration out of the eyes. But if we accept that all adaptations are explained by selection, then we run the risk of concluding that eyebrows were selected for because of their drainage properties, based simply on the fact that their drainage properties are useful. Now, it may well be true that eyebrows evolved in this way. But we must be careful not to reach this conclusion by the wrong route. Our belief that selection explains adaptation should not lead us to believe that selection explains everything good in the world. If selection explains all adaptation, then whether something is an adaptation depends not only on whether it serves a purpose, but whether it had a certain sort of causal origin-a selective origin. After all, things with different causal origins may equally well serve current needs. Let us resolve to call a character an "adaptation" only when we mean to assert that the character evolved selectively to serve a specific purpose. This is consistent with reflective biological practice.
H this stipulation seems odd, consider a parallel bit of semantics from psychology. Thirty years ago psychologists talked about the "learning" oflanguage. Now the topic is the "acquisition" oflanguage. Today we expect quite different things from a course entitled "Learning" and one entitled .. Cognition." To the lay individual there is nothing especially theory-laden about the term "learning." As far as the individual in the street knows, a course in "learning theory" might well discuss mental images and the language of thought. But within the profession these terms have taken on proprietary meanings. Whether a particular ontogenetic change exhibits .. learning" or .. cognition" depends, as we sometimes say, on which theory you believe. (Actually, it depends on which theory is true.) To call a change in 578 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1990) 13:3 behavior "learning" is to assert that it arose as a result of a certain kind of causal process. This was a semantic decision, made at quite an early stage by linguists and cognitive psychologists. They could have launched a crusade to rescue the term .. learning" from the behaviorists, but they tactically surrendered the terminology. The behaviorist credo was accepted -all learning was conditioning. The important question remained; which features of behavioral change are cases of learning?
It might be difficult for generative linguists to explain to lay individuals just why they were reluctant to say that little Johnny is learning English. Cenerativists would have to explain that the term "learning" is associated with a particular psychological theory -in their opinion, the wrong one. They might then describe the alternative theory, and why they prefer the nonselectionist explanation of language development. The debates about adaptationism are similar. Presented only with adaptationism and its denial, the nonspecialist is hard put to imagine what the debate is about. What is the alternative to adaptationism? Dennett gives very little help in this regard. He names a few alternatives mentioned by Could & Lewontin (genetic drift, material compensation, "phyletic inertia," and architectural constraints; Dennett 1983, p. 352), but with no particular regard for their nature. Usually he refers only to the "historicarchitectural" preferences of Could and Lewontin.
Just as linguists have alternatives to behaviorism which underwrite their rejection of"learning theory," there are substantive nonadaptational evolutionary explanations which underwrite the criticisms of adaptationism. I will try to show that at least some of these alternatives are to adaptationism as cognitive and nativist psychological theories are to behaviorist psychology. The basic formula is this: On the one hand are theories which explain existing characters as environmentally selected results of randomly generated variation. On the other hand are theories which explain existing characters as environmentally influenced variations on highly conservative structures, and explain change by reference to complex internal mediating mechanisms. On this second sort of view, the environment may shape the expressed outcome of development, but the shaping effects are signiflcantly constrained by internal structure. Theories of the first sort (let us call them .. environmentalist") include behaviorist learning theories t.md selectionist/adaptationist biology. Theories of the second sort ("structuralist") include nativist and cognitive psychology, and evolutionary theories which stress, (or example, morphological and embryological constraints on evolution (see Maynard Smith et al. 1985 , for a recent discussion).
3. How adaptationists defend adaptation/sm. Research programs are based on central factual beliefs. The term "adaptationisin." is used both to refer to an evolutionary research program and to its central factual belief. The belief is that the great majority of characters of organisms are recognizable adaptations to environments, formed in their detail by natural selection. The research program of the same name uses the belief as a guide to further research -one assumes that a complex structure is an adaptation, and attempts to devise a selective explanation consistent with the known (or the plausibly hypothesized) facts of natural history.
Qua research program, adaptationism is indeed unfalsifiable, but benignly so. After all, research programs are "instruments" of research generation. Instrumentalism is true of research programs, and Dennett is right to defend them on this ground. The story is different when "adaptationism" refers to the factual belief on which the research program is based. If adaptationists systematically fail to consider nonadaptive explanations of characters, as Could & Lewontin claim they do, then their factual belief in the ubiquity of adaptation is immunized from challenge. An unfalsifiable belief is worse than an unfalsifiable research program.
Most biological defenses of adaptationism adopt a strategy different from Dennett's. They do not defend the unfalsifiability 4 This may give the appearance of unencumbered adaptationism -the sort which asserts adaptedness without any commitment to its cause. But whatever the outcome of a comparative study, it will be subject to selectionist evaluation. In the words of a critic of Gould & Lewontin, adaptationism "is a method of generating hypotheses based on our knowledge of the processes and limitations of natural selection." (Brown 1982, p. 884, emphasis added.) I submit that any proposed adaptationist explanation which cannot be supported by a plausible selectionist s~enario will· be, for that reason alone, rejected by modem adaptationists. Today's adaptationist, like William Paley, expects the world to be rich in adaptations. Unlike Paley, his faith is in selection. A character, no matter how useful or cleverly related to an organism· s needs, will not be seen as an adaptation unless it can be explained as an outcome of particular mechanisms of natural selection.
There are many productive lines of research in biology which give alternatives to adaptationist explanations. 5 None of the alternatives denies that natural selection will produce adaptation. Rather, it is contended (1) that other evolutionary forces may give rise to patterns of complex characters best accounted for by nonselective explanations, or (2) that there are reasons to doubt that the conditions necessary for the operation of natural selection actually obtained in the evolutionary history of a purported adaptation.
Recall that the operation of natural selection requires copious, heritable, nondirected variation. This is the source from which the environment selects reproductively successful variants. But suppose that there is some internal, nonenvironmental mechanism which constrains the variation of a certain character within a phylogenetic lineage. The discovery of this constraint contributes to the explanation of why organisms in that lineage exhibit the characters they do. In doing so, it reduces th~ scope of any selectionist/adaptationist explanation of the same facts. Suppose that the variations occur preferentially in a certain direction. This also reduces the scope of the Continuing Commentary selectionist explanation. The absence of environmental competition from non-character-holders erodes the force of selectionism yet again.
My present purpose is not to argue that such constraints, biases, and non-competitive environments actually existed in the history oflife on earth. These are questions of fact. The point is this: Adaptation ism hangs on these questions of fact. Consider one example. Many respectable biologists believe that terrestrial vertebrates have never had variation for limb number. Without variation, there· is nothing for the environment to select. Unlike the insects, the deep developmental processes which have been constant in land vertebrates strongly constrain limb number. Our ancestors the lobe-finned fishes had four, and we inherited their developmental program. You and I an<l dogs and bats do vary in the morphology of our limbs, and today's great diversity must result largely from adaptive selection. But even here it is argued that variation is biased by embryological mechanisms, for example, that digits can be added and lost only in certain orders (Shubin & Alberch 1986) . In amongst the diversity lurk universals; selection and adaptation probably explain diversity, but structural constraints may explain universals.
This should sound familiar to students of psychology and linguistics. Postbehaviorist linguists propose linguistic universals, and internal constraints on language acquisition. Surely some of language is "learned" in an environmentalist way, involving reinforcement and whatnot. But the explanatory force of environmental selection is eroded by the nonrandomness of the child's responses, and the evidence for complex internal processes which mediate the child/environment interaction. It is often claimed that the child's linguistic environment contains too little behavioral training (i.e. selection) to account for the complex development observed. Something else, innate and internal, must account for the development. If these claims are true, then the environmentalist/selectionist theory-Skinner's theory-is weakened. This is one of many parallels between the environmentalist-versus-structuralist debates in biology and those in psychology. I will spare the reader further details, but repeat one reminder -at issue are factual matters, not to be settled by methodology-slinging alone. The issues are similar in biology and psychology, but not in the way Dennett suggests.
4. Dennett's defense of adaptation/sm. Up to this point my argument may sound like false dichotomy .
• After all, perhaps Dennett and I are both right -adaptationism is in some ways like mentalism and in others like behaviorism. (Dennett himself has recently taken this approach; Dennett 1987.) But, as it happens, adaptationism is not like mentalism in the ways Dennett says. Notice that he and I have chosen different aspects of antibehaviorist psychology to emphasize. I cite the causal explanatory force of postulated internal structures, while he cites the assumption of optimal rationality needed to support intentional interpretations. My focus is syntactic; his is semantic. To see the significance of this, recall that Dennett's notion of the "intentional stance" involves a special and somewhat controversial view on the relations between mentalistic psychological ascriptions and the causal insides of the psychological subject. He holds that mentalistic ascriptions of beliefs and desires have a sort of explanatory value even if no genuine, causal, internal mental structures exist to be identified as those beliefs and desires. The value of mentalistic talk lies not in its reference to an internal, causally active reality, but in its instrumental usefulness in making predictions and inspiring experiments. (This is not a majority view among philosophers. Many believe that mentalism has explanatory force only if it describes actual, internal causes. There are disagreements, of course, on whether this condition is satisfied.)
Dennett has recommended the intentional stance to cognitive ethologists. It has not been generally noticed that this suggestion has two distinct instrumentalist implications. First and uncontroversially (as noted above) the stance is a research BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1990) 13:3 program, an instrument for generating research. Second, Dennett's view on mentality gives an instrumental interpretation to each program-inspired mentalistic explanation. So not only the program, but each of its products, is an instrument for prediction. The ethologist would be mistaken who expected the intentional stance to yield objectively accurate causal descriptions of vervet monkeys' cognitive insides.
Dennett applies his two-pronged instrumentalism to adaptationism in a manner exactly consistent with his analogy. Not only adaptationism-the-program, but also individual adaptive explanations lack reference to specific causal processes. Even intentionality, the mentalist's Holy Grail. is given an adaptationist analog. 'The indirect bearing of the Eiffel Tower on my thought about the Eiffel Tower, like the indirect bearing of the toxicity of those ancestral bee corpses that weren't removed from their hives on the current behavior vis-3.-vis corpses of today' s bees, is not the sort of relation that can be illuminated by a mechanistic, nonintentional account, however voluminous." Dennett sees this unilluminating, mechanistic, nonintcntional account as including selection mechanisms; it is Gould & Lewontin (not adaptationists) who foolishly advocate "unadorned mechanical history of actual selection" (Dennett 1985, p. 764) .
Dennett points out, correctly, that the truth of a nonadaptationist story (e.g., a Laplacean microphysical account) does not require the falsehood of all adaptationist stories of the same feature. He then attributes the denial of this belief to adaptationism's critics. As evidence that anti-adaptationists have physical reductionist tendencies, Dennett quotes a case -the only specific case mentioned in his adaptationism discussion. The case i5 the one discussed above -quadrapedality in terrestrial vertebrates. The nonadaptationist explanation is that the ancestral species had four limbs. This structural account asserts that ancestry, rather than adaptation, explains quadrapedality. Dennett analyzes the case as follows: He attributes the nonadaptationist conclusion to reductionism -the false belief that adaptationist explanations arc in competition with causal ones. 6 Adaptationists would be expected to develop an optimalizing rationale for quadrapedality, unrestrained by the physicalist/ structuralist alternative.
Is this how adaptationists think? Is the affection for "mechanical histories of actual selection" a mistake of anti-adaptationists? Does the relation between an adaptation of today and a selective mechanism of yesteryear involve the deep problem of "aboutness"? Are particular adaptive explanations actually tools for prediction, independent of physical history? Here are the words of adaptationists, quoted from passages specifically responding to antiadaptationist criticism. Richard Dawkins reports that, "the adaptationist controversy ... is concerned with whether, given that we are dealing with a phenotypic effect big enough to see and ask questions about, we should assume that it is the product of natural selection." {Dawkins 1982, p. 33) Later, "The nco-Darwinian adaptationist ... insists upon knowing the exact nature of the selective process that has led to the evolution of the putative adaptation." (ibid., p. 51) These passages do not sound as if mechanistic histories of selection were something the adaptationist could just as well do without. And would an adaptationist float an optimizing rationale over the ancestry explanation of quadrapedality?Verne Grant, even while "striking back" (his expression) against critics ofadaptationism, specif ically accepts the ancestry explanation of quadrapcdality. He does not accuse its proponents of reductionism, and does not propose a free floating adaptive rationale (Grant 1983, p. 155) . If adaptationism were decoupled from the mechanisms of selection in the way Dennett says, we should be able to find adaptationists who doubted whether a particular adaptation were indeed the causal result of a specific physical history of selection. There have been many such thinkers, of course. But then along came Darwin.
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BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1990) 13:3 5. A caution to adaptatlonlsts. My version of the psychology/biology analogy stresses similarities in the causes cited by Skinner and adaptationists, and in the sorts of causal constraints cited by their critics. Dennett cites optimality, a commitment said to be shared by mentalists and adaptationists, as the central feature of his version. To be sure, both mentalists and adaptationists make optimality assumptions. But do they do so for relevantly similar reasons? Evolutionary adaptationists regard optimality as an implication of a specific causal theory -Darwinian selection. If the conditions necessary for unconstrained selection are present, optimal adaptation is to be expected. But for mentalistic psychology, the story is more intricate.
Mentalists assume optimal rationality in a psychological subject because if they didn't there would be no criterion for correctness in the semantic interpretation of mental states. As Quine (1960, pp. 59, 69) showed in his discussion of "radical translation," any semantic interpretation is as good as any other when we suppose our subject to be irrational. Mentalists, by definition, want to make semantic interpretations. It seems that there is no way to do so, under our present state of knowledge, without presuming rationality. We rely on rationality by default -because we have nothing else to rely on. The mentalist would be freed from his dependence on rationality if a better way of assigning semantic content were available. Imagine that a mentalistic N cwton or Einstein were to come along with an acceptable, naturalistic, causal theory of intentional content assignment -perhaps a nice little neurological or behavioral semantics. We would no longer be forced to aswme optimal rationality. It would be independently testable. We simply assign our semantic interpretations as the theory tells us, and then assess the subject's beliefs by our nowindependent normative criteria of rationality. Today, sad to say, such a theory is not available. In its absence, mentalism does not (and cannot) derive rationality from a specific causal theory.
Mentalism reluctantly assumes optimality for lack of anything better. So the cornerstone of Dennett's analogy between adaptationism and mentalism is an epiphenomenon. Optimality is a concept which adaptationists anchor to a central causal theory, and which mentalists presuppose for lack of one. 7 Given Dennett's views on mentalism, there is no reason for him to be embarrassed by the lack of causal warrant for the optimality assumption. In noncausal theories, calling something an "epiphenomenon" is no special curse. If belief-ascriptions are tools for prediction, and if optimality assumptions prove to be useful tool-sharpeners, then why worry about independent causal warrants?
The problem is that Dennett's disenchantment with causal theories has resulted in an insensitivity to the causal texture of evolutionary theory. He removes from adaptationism its commitment to selectionist causation and replaces it with the problem of intentionality. The one thing which saves modern adaptationism from starry-eyed, contentless, Leibnizian pseudooptimism is its commitment (in principle at least) to Darwinian mechanisms and to the hard cold facts of natural history. Intentionality, on the other hand, is the most notorious unsolved problem of modern philosophy. The tradeoff is not a bargain for biologists. Keep in mind that the critics of adaptationism do have causal warrant. Adaptationism is to be defended not against people who find it instrumentally useless, as incapable of "generating questions to ask Nature." It must be defended against specific alternative causal explanations of evolutionary phenomena. If adaptationists accept Dennett's exchange, if they commit themselves to optimal adaptation on instrumental rather than on causal grounds, Pangloss may live but Darwin will die. Dennett's defense of adaptationism is a poisoned pilL NOTES 1. Dennett (1975) Amundson's insightful and entertaining commentary on my defense of adaptationism closes with a warning to the adaptationist (and indirectly to the ethologist): The tradeoff I propose to biologists is ""not a bargain"'; it is ""a poisoned pill."
I concur with his warning against the view he describes as mine: It is not the view I have espoused, however. Amundson has reacted to some exaggerations and incautious remarks of mine with some exaggerations ofhis own, but since he is not" alone in reading me this way, I accept the blame for the misdirection.
Amundson is certainly right when he urges adaptationists not to abandon their obligations to the causal histories of the features they hope to describe as adaptations. But what he describes as my ""disenchantment with causal theories" is nothing of the kind. My point was rather that biologists who claim to rely abstemiously on nothing but unvarnished, uninterpreted causal histories of actual selection are kidding themselves; that is just as impossible as the Skinnerian dream of a psychology that does all its explaining and predicting by appeal to nothing but an unvarnished history of reinforcement. What I have advertised is not a "noncausal" theory of adaptations (or of Continuing Commentary beliefs and desires), but rather indirectly causal theories. Just as there has to he some intelligible causal path that grounds a claim such as "he didn't think the gun was loaded" (it can"t be defended just because it fits so nicely with a particular story one likes to tell), so there has to be some intelligible causal path that grounds any claim about an adaptation. I wanted just to show how any such path becomes intelligible only on interpre1ation -from the intentional stance, with its inevitable assumption of optimality or rationality. (I hope this has become clearer in Dennett 1987 and 1988.) The ""free-floating rationales" I have pointed to are not utterly unanchored-they are just not tied to independently identifiable representations of those rationales in the causal ancestry. Just as it is folly to look for the brain-writing to clinch ""he didn't know the gun was loaded"-the (brain-)writing might exist, hut its existence is not required for the truth ofthe claim-so it is folly to think that for every adaptation there must be something analogous to a specifiC change order in a design-and-manufacturing project. Unless one were to suppose-with zero plausibility-that the design process of natural selection can never ""kill two birds with one stone," one should not expect to be able to ··read olf' the adaptation claims licensed by even total historical infurmation about causation, birth, and death.
Amundson says, .. The ethologist would he mistaken who expected the intentional stance to yield objectively accurate causal descriptions of verve! monkeys" cognitive insides." This is true if we read it to assert that the intentional stance does not directly yield such causal descriptions; but of course the whole point of adopting the intentional stance is to work directly toward that very goal: objectively accurate causal descriptions of creatures" cognitive insides. (see Dennett 1989) Amundson points out that he and I emphasize different aspects of both behaviorism and mentalism, which is why when we line them both up with adaptationism and its critics, we get the opposite mapping. He sees Chomsky's structuralism as the central mentalist alternative to behaviorism, whereas I have always viewed that as a weirdly extremist doctrine {"nobody ever learns anything") held by a vocal minority of mentalists (or .. cognitive scientists"). There is a mapping from these extremists of cognitive science onto extremists in evolutionary theory: those who hold that there really is only trivial selectionthe constraining structures and principles are (nearly) totally constraining. I don·t put Lewontin and Gould in that camp of critics, hut rather into the puritanical camp of critics who think that interpretation that uses optimization is to be steadfastly avoided-an impossible ideal they themselves cannot live by. When I aligned adaptationism with mentalism, I was thinking of the mentalists who agree with the behaviorists in thinking that there is genuine learning (as opposed to mere ""triggering"), but who disagree with them about how thatis to be described and explained. As Amundson shrewdly observes, I was not just poking fun with my parallel. My advice to Skinnerians has always been: loosen up, and notice that you can have all the virtues of causal-historical science plus ··mentalistic"' interpretation as an indispensible lever; so my advice to Gould and Lewontin is the same: You can't do biology without optimality assumptions, so instead of condemning the game, learn the rules.
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